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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent, )
-vs-

)

GEORGE OLIVER DUMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 14176

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
*

*

*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was a criminal action brought by the State
of Utah against defendant-appellant George Oliver Dumas charging
him with aggravated robbery, a felony in the First Degree,
in violation of 76-6-302, Utah Code Annot, 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
Salt Lake County, Utah, on June 12th, 1975 the jury found the
appellant guilty of attempted aggravated robbery, a lesser
included offense to the offense charged.

Subsequently, appellant

was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to
fifteen years as provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing his
conviction and quashing the Information filed herein, or in
the alternative, remanding the case to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial consistent* with the rulings of this
Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Information charged appellant George Oliver Dumas
with having robbed Robert Allen Haynes and Richard DeLucia by
the use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm on or about February 19, 19 75 in Salt Lake County, Utah.

In support of its charge

the State introduced the following witnesses and evidence.
Claude Aaron Parks testified that he was released
from Leavenworth Penitentiary on February 18, 19 75 and that
he boarded a bus bound for Washington (T.16)*.

While on the

bus he met the victims of the alleged robbery Robert Haynes
and Richard DeLucia (T.16).

During the course of their journey

they produced some quantities of illegal drugs (T.17).

After

having partaken of a modest quantity of these drugs, the trio
arrived at Salt Lake City sometime on the evening of February
19th.

Parks testified that when he reached Salt Lake he phoned

Gail Boone, with whom he had served time at the Utah State Prison

* Hereinafter "T" designations shall refer to the Transcript
of Trial Proceedings.
-2-

(T.18), and arranged to meet Boone at the Salt Palace in Salt
Lake City (T.19).

Subsequently, Boone arrived and a meeting

occured in the parking lot of the Salt Palace at which Parks
told Boone of the narcotics in the hands of Haynes and DeLucia,
(T.21), trading the information for a change of clothes and
a plane ticket to Washington.

Subsequently a second meeting

was held in the parking lot of the Salt Palace between Parks,
Boone, and defendant-appellant Dumas (T.23).

At this meeting

no reference was made to plans to rob Haynes and DeLucia (T.24*26).
Thereafter Parks proceeded back to the Greyhound Bus Terminal.
A meeting of several individuals including Gail Boonei George
Dumas, Richard Ronald Nielson, and two other individuals,
together with Claude Parks occurred in the restroom of the bus
depot during which reference to Haynes1 and DeLucia's possession
of narcotics was made (T.28).

Parks indicated that he would

try to get Haynes and DeLucia outside on the street (T.30) and
he "thinks" Dumas indicated that he and some others would ffget
into position" (T.31).

Subsequently, Parks did entice Haynes

and DeLucia to the street.

When they got outside, Nielson was

seven or eight feet from their position and Dumas was some
fifteen feet up the street (T.33).

After trying to talk Haynes

and DeLucia out of the drugs, Parks motioned to Nielson who
accosted Haynes and DeLucia and pulled a rifle from under his
coat (T.36).
position.

Dumas apparently remained standing in the same

He testified that Nielson hit DeLucia on the head

with the stock of a sawed-off rifle (T.38) and that he (Parks)
got into a struggle over the weapon which developed between
Nielson and DeLucia (T.38).

Parks apparently succeeded in

getting the gun away whereupon he ran, with the gun, to the
Salt Palace (T.39).

Parks also testified that a red Pantera

automobile (which subsequently proven to belong to defendant
Dumas) was parked nearby, adjacent to the sidewalk (T.40).

He

testified that he later met Boone at the Salt Palace and they
disposed of the gun in a trash can (T.41-43).

Parks testified

that he was subsequently accosted by some policemen and arrested
(T.44-46).
Jeff McCullin, a bus passenger, testified to having
seen the red Pantera parked in front of the bus depot.

He

did not see the individuals park or alight from the car (Vol.11 T
He also saw four "muscular" individuals none of whom he could
identify, walk into the bus station (Vol.11 T.18).

He went

outside and saw one person running to the right and another
running toward the Salt Palace.

He could not identify these

individuals (Vol.11 T.17).
Teddy Klassen testified to being at the bus depot
in the company of Mr. McCullin and a girl (Vol.11 T.19).

He

corroborated the presence of the red Pantera in front of the
bus depot and stated that he walked outside after it arrived
(T.20).

He also saw three muscular individuals apparently

in the vicinity of the bus depot (Vol.11 T.21).

He saw a heavy

set individual running toward the Salt Palace with a long object
in his hand (Vol.11 T.22).

Thereafter several policemen arrived

(Vol.11 T.22).
The State then called Robert Allen Haynes, one of
the purported victims (Vol.11 T.25) who indicated that he made
a bus trip to Salt Lake City carrying a suitcase (Exhibit 3)
containing some drugs including marijuana, cocaine, and quailude
(Vol.11 T.27-28).

He acknowledged having become acquainted

with Mr. Parks on the bus (Vol.11 T.28),and giving him a small
quantity of drugs (Vol.11 T.29).

He also stated that when

he arrived in Salt Lake sometime around 6:00 o'clock he had
some $2000 in his possession (Vol.II T.30)•

While in the bus

depot Mr. Parks accosted him indicating that he wanted to buy
some cocaine.

Haynes declined, an argument ensued, and he,

Parks, and DeLucia went out the door of the bus depot (Vol.11
T.32).

Outside, adjacent to the front door of the depot,

Parks indicated that if they did not give him the cocaine he
would take it from them.

Thereupon, according to Haynes, two

men approached from the left at a rapid rate.

One of the men

pushed him and ordered him not to move, indicating that he
had a gun.

The man on the right pulled a short .22 rifle from

under his coat and threatened Haynes with it. Haynes grabbed
the barrel, a struggel ensued in which Parks involved himself,
and as a result the gun fell to the ground (Vol.11 T.33-38).
During the struggle Haynes received an injury to his head.

He

thought he had been shot, but it is more likely that he was struck.
After the struggle Parks picked up the gun and ran across the
street (Vol.11 T.38) and both of the victims ran toward the rear
of the terminal.

The witness identified the assailants as appel-

lant and Richard Ronald Nielson (Vol.II T,40).

As the victims

fled down the alley Haynes observed that Nielson was chasing
them.

Haynes went into the bus station through the garage area,

concerned mainly about having his injury treated (Vol.11 T.42).
His testimony was absent any indication that anything was taken
from him in the course of the incident.
John C. Davis, a Salt Lake City Police Officer, testified that he impounded a red Pantera registered to appellant
in front of the Greyhound Bus depot on the evening in question
(Vol.11 T.94).
The State then called Richard DeLucia, the other vicim
of the alleged robbery.

DeLucia corroborated most of the events

prior to the robbery itself, which he stated occurred between
8:00 and 8:30 p.m. (Vol. II T.98-103).

His description of the

robbery itself corroborated that of Mr. Haynes.

Additionally,

he testified that the two alleged robbers came from the direction
of the Pantera.

He corroborated Haynes1 testimony that the gun

wielding assailant was appellant Dumas.
not hear a shot fired (Vol.11 T.108).

He stated that he did

He said that during the

scuffle he jumped on Nielson!s back, and that after the scuffle
he ran to the parking lot of the Salt Palace.

He said that Niel-

son pursued him, caught him, and pushed him to the ground (Vol.11
T.110).

At this time a white Chevrolet automobile drove up

containing two other individuals (neither of whom was appellant),
one of whom got out of the car and bound and gagged him with
white surgical tape (Vol.11 T.110-111).

Whereupon, he identified

Nielson as the man who removed money from his person and kicked
him in the eye (Vol.11 T.112-114).
Kenneth Thirsk, a Salt Lake City narcotics officer,
identified a quantity of money delivered to him by Haynes and
a suitcase containing the drugs which Haynes and DeLucia had
transported from New York, which were admitted into evidence.
Office John Foster, a Salt Lake City Policeman testified
that he was the initial investigating officer of the alleged
robbery.

He stated that he talked to DeLucia who indicated that

the only item taken from him had been a locker key (Vol.Ill T.24).
DeLucia apparently related the details of the incident to him.
He testified that subsequently on the same evening he saw the
appellant Dumas in the custody of Officers Humphreys and Rackley
who had returned Dumas to the bus depot.

At the time seen by

Officer Foster, the appellant was wearing a v-neck pull-over
and a pendant around his neck (Vol.Ill T.28).

He did not see

whether or not he was wearing additional jewelry because he did
not see his hands (Vol.Ill T.28).

Officer Rackley testified

that he had arrested appellant at the Salt Palace sometime after
the robbery had occurred (Vol.Ill T.10).

John Johnson, a Salt Lake City Police Detective, admitted that the victims, when initially relating the details
of the robbery to him, indicated that only one assailant approached and that they did not know which of the assailants had the
gun (Vol.Ill T.44).
On behalf of defendant Nielson, several witnesses were
called to testify that between 7:30 and 8:30 he was engaged in
a conversation with one Cindy Jordan, and that subsequently,
near 9:00 he was seen at Ceasar's Lounge in Murray (Vol.Ill T.6789).

On behalf of defendant Dumas, Roger Jones, the Salt Lake

City jailer introduced a booking slip which indicated that when
booked Mr. Dumas was in possession of a large quantity of turquoise jewelry (Vol.Ill T.98).
Teddy Klassen was recalled and testified that when
he saw Mr. Dumas at the bus depot he was not wearing a trench
coat (Vol.Ill T.103).

He also testified that he saw a light

gray Chevrolet automobile in the front of the bus depot at or
about the time of the robbery,
Claude Parks was recalled and testified that there
was no conversation concerning the robbery at the time he met
Mr. Dumas in the parking lot at the Salt Palace in the company
of Mr. Boone (Vol.Ill T.lll); that at no time in the evening
in question did he see Mr. Dumas wearing a trench coat (Vol.Ill
T.116); and that Mr. Dumas and the other individuals with whom
he had been seen in the lavatory of the bus depot were down the

street at the time the robbery incident occurred (Vol,III T.116).
He reiterated the fact that only himself and Nielson were directly
involved in accosting the victims (Vol.Ill T.127).
ARGUMENT
PREFATORY NOTE TO ARGUMENT
Three aspects of the State?s presentation of this case
cast a deep shadow over proper resolution of the factual issues
raised.

Because of the overriding nature and persistent effect

of these factors, appellant urges the Court to bear them in mind
as it reads and considers the individual issues presented by this
appeal.
First, appellant was tried in a joint trial with codefendant Richard Ronald Nielson, whose defenses were in such
substantial conflict with those adduced by appellant as to substantially inpede appellant's right to defend the allegations
of the Information and fairly rebut the evidence against him.
See pp. 30 through 31, supra.
Second, the State introduced evidence against the defendant which was internally inconsistent, with the result that
he was forced to defend what were essentially two separate crimes
based on entirely separate acts.

Haynes and DeLucia (pp. 5 and

6, supra) testified that appellant accosted them as a direct
participant in an attempted robbery.

Claude Aaron Parks testi-

fied that appellant had not directly participated in the robbery
but had merely been present when comments were made about the

fact that the robbery was going to occur (p.3, supra).
Third, is the fact that the State in its argument to
the jury (supported by the instructions by the Court) encouraged
the jury to find appellant guilty under one of two separate theor
of criminal culpability, to-wit: either as a direct participant,

or as an

ff

aider and abettor 1 1 as defined by the laws of the S t a t e

of Utah.
I
THE EVIDENCE AS TO APPELLANT IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT
The thrust of the State's rather ambiguous allegations
as to the conduct of appellant as it related to the robbery are
summarized by the, prosecutor at Vol.IV T.15.

J
I

What about Mr. Dumas1 participation in
the crime? DeLucia and Haynes said he had the
gun. Parks said he didn't. What difference
does it make? The Court instructed you in the
instruction ... with regard to principals.
It is not just two guys going in to rob a bank.
Now, the two guys go in to rob it and they have
a third man driving a get away car. They go
in and take the property by means of force and
fear. They are not the only ones going to be
responsible. Also responsible is the man outside, although, as a factual matter, he didn't
go and take the funds by force and fear. You
are talking about "principal11*. It is not the
person that directly commits the offense. Anyone who aids, intentionally aids, encourages,
solicites, commands .. read the instruction.
The commission of that offense, not everyone
in this offense got involved in the struggle,
.'Whether it was Mr. Nielson or Mr. Dumas, that
is for you to decide which one. What difference
does it make who had the gun? They were both
there, responsible for each others conduct.
Give that some thought. Was Mr. Dumas involved
or wasn't he?

Appellant finds fault with two aspects of this argument.

The

first one is that "involvement11 is not necessarily a crime.
The second is that it does make a substantial difference who
had the gun and v/ho directly participated in the robbery in light
of the fact that if direct participation was not performed by
Dumas, some act must be shown to have been committed by him which
was integrally related to the substance of the offense.
The State did not directly contend that Dumas actually
had the weapon or actually accosted the victims despite the fact
that two of its star witnesses so testified.

Thus, attention

is now directed to the alternative theory of guilt asserted
against Mr. Dumas which was that he was a "aider and abettor"
of other principals in the offense.
Controlling Utah authority on the meaning of "aiding
and abetting" is found in State v. Laub, 102 U.402, 131 P.2d
805 and State v. Johnson, 6 U.2d 29, 305 P.2d 488. An examination
of these opinions is instructive in light of the facts of this
case.
In Laub, supra, four individuals were present on a
cattle range,

Witnesses saw three of the men merging from the

woods covered with blood.
vehicle.

The fourth man was standing near a

It was demonstrated that a calf had been recently

slaughtered in the same area, and that one or more of the four
defendants had been in possession of a beef carcass.

There was

evidence that certain of the individuals made inconsistent ex-

planations to witnesses of the circumstances of the case.

The

Court held that circumstantial evidence against three of the
four defendants was sufficient to justify conviction.

In re-

versing the conviction of the fourth defendant the Court said:
Cannon however, is in a different position.
He was not with the other three defendants
when they came from the woods. He did not have
any blood on him, nor did he stay with the other
defendants so that the court or jury could infer
that he helped bring the carcass to the truck.
The uncontradicted evidence is that he went
with the Trumans to help them load their wood
and did not rejoin the other defendants until
they were ready to leave for home. The only
evidence which points to his guilt is that he
made false statements about trading pine nuts
for the meat in Nevada and he took part of
the meat. This is not sufficient evidence to
uphold his conviction. This is not a charge
of conspiracy and there is no evidence that
he in any way aided in or planned the commission of the crime.
In Johnson, supra, defendant was observed looking in
a store window when his companion was inside committing a burglary.
He was then seen walking rapidly towards the rear of the building.
There was evidence that defendant hid a ladder which his companion
had used to gain entrance and was acting as a look-out for the
companion.

This court concluded that from the evidence and the

reasonable inferences therefrom a jury was justified in finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of aiding
and abetting his confederate in the burglary.

In so holding,

the court specifically relied upon the presence of direct affirmative evidence that defendant had performed acts which materially
aided the confederate to commit the burglary, particularly in

hiding the ladder which was used by the confederate in gaining
entry to the store, and the inference that he was acting as a
look-out*
The concensus of these Utah cases is that the State
must show evidence of affirmative verbal or physical conduct
integrally related to the direct commission of the offense in
order to sustain a conviction for "aiding and abetting,"

Such

a consensus would be consistent with the holdings of the Supreme
Court of the United States and those of iftost of the Courts of
Appeals related to this issue.

The Supreme Court has indicated

that one must consciously share in the criminal act in order to
be a principal, whether an aider or abettor, or otherwise.

Pereira

v. U.S., 347 U.S. 1, 98 L.Ed. 435, 74 S.Ct. 358; and further that
one is an accomplice

ff

if with purpose of promoting or facilitating

the crime, he ... substantially facilitates its commission,11
Scales v. U.S. , 367 U.S. 203, 6 L,Ed.2d 782, 81 S.Ct. 1469, rehearing den., 360 U.S. 978, 6 L.Ed. 2d 12^7, 81 S.Ct. 1912. The
Second Circuit has held that the mere fact that one is in the
company of another who commits a crime is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.
Cir. 1962).

U.S. v. Garguilo, 312 F.2d 249 (2d

In that case the Circuit additionally held that

knov/ledge that a crime is being committed even when coupled with
presence of the scene is generally not enough to constitute aiding
and abetting.

The Tenth Circuit has held that active assistance

is required to justify a conviction for aiding and abetting.

White v. U.S., 366 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1966) ; and additionally
held that mere presence at the scene is not sufficient, King
v. U.S., 402 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1968).

The driving of a get

away car has consistently been held to be sufficient, see e.g.
U.S. v. Young, 468 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1972), cert, denied 414
U.S. 849, 38 L.Ed.2d 97, 94 S.Ct. 139, as has active participation
as a look-out.

See e.g. Johnson, supra.

A plethora of cases hold that a mere presence at the
scene of a crime is insufficient to justify a conviction for aiding
and abetting.

Snyder V. U.S., 448 F.2d 716 (C.A. N.D. 1971);

U.S. v. Joiner, 429 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1970); U.S. v. Holt, 427
F.2d 1114 (C.A. Mo. 1970).

In dictum the United States Supreme

Court has held that "aiding and abetting means to assist the
perpetrator of the crime (citing Hitch v. United States, 150 U.S.
442, 14 S.Ct. 144, 37 L.Ed. 1137 and United States v. PiRe, 332
U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed.'210)for the proposition that
presence at the scene of a crime is not evidence of guilt as an
aider and abettor". U.S. v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 95 L.Ed.747,
71 S.Ct.595.

Perhaps the best synthesis of all of this is found

in Long v. U.S., 360 F.2d 829 (1966) in which the District of
Columbia's Circuit stated that mere presence at the scene is enough
only if it is "intended to and does aid the primary actors".
Similarly, see U.S. v. Moses, 122 F.Supp. 523 (D.G. Penn. 1954)
in which the Pennsylvania United States District Court held that
"aiding and abetting" implies and requires some conduct of an

affirmative nature, and mere negative acquiesence is not sufficient.
Of similar import is the instruction given to the jury
in this case which is consistent with Sec. 76-2-202; obviously
given in contemplation of the possibility that the jury may not
have believed that appellant directly participated in the robbery:
Criminal responsibility for direct commission o"? offense or for conduct of another. Every person, acting with a mental state required
for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicites, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
This statutes is consistent with the case law in requiring direct
and affirmative verbal or physical conduct as a precondition
to convicition.

Two aspects of the statute require physical

acts, to-wit: those who directly commit a crime or "aid" another
to engage in conduct which constitute and offense.

The balance

of the section relates to verbal conduct which can make one liable
as a party for the commission of crime.

Inasmuch as there was

no allegation of verbal conduct of the sort described in Sec.
76-2-202, no further consideration thereof is required in this
case.

An examination of the conduct.of the appellant in light

of the language of the statute and the case holdings under which
it must be construed demonstrate that his conviction as an "aider
and abettor" cannot be upheld.

;
•

•

•

•

•

'

•

The State relies on the following facts to demonstrate
that Dumas was an "principal in this offense", excluding its
-15-

i

contradictory allegations that he directly involved himself in
the robbery.
1.
His
Pantera automobile was outside the
bus depot with Mr. Parks1 coat in it (Vol.IV T.6).
2.
Parks saw Dumas in the parking lot of the
Salt Palace in the company of Gale Boone, at which
time no conversation concerning a robbery occurred
(Vol.IV T.6).
3.
Dumas was present in front of the bus depot
standing some distance away when the robbery occurred
( according to Mr. Parks)(Vol.IV T.11).
4*
Dumas left his car sitting in front of the
bus depot after the robbery with the keys in it (Vol.IV
T.16).
5.
bus depot
was being
fact that
versation

Mr. Dumas1 presence in the bathroom of the
during a period of time when the robbery
discussed (Vol.IV T.65), coupled with the
Mr. Dumas did not disavow any of that conaccording to the evidence.

6.
The State then alleged that Dumas had "planned
the robbery11 (Vol. IV T.66). There was no direct evidence of this whatsoever.
All of the foregoing is circumstantial.

It does show

that appellant was present when the robbery occurred and there
is an indication that he may have known that it was going to
occur.

Nonetheless, the cases hold that those two facts, even

when coupled together, are insufficient to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The absence of any evidence of an

act integrally related to or required to faciliate the robbery
is absent.

Failing such proof, the State asked the jury to

speculate that Mr. Dumas participated in planning the robbery
which, under the cases would make him an aider and abettor if

his actions constituted active encouragement (Vol.IV T.65).
Nonetheless, Mr. Parks, the only witness to the conversations
which led up to the robbery, testified that Mr. Dumas did not
participate in planning the robbery, and that at best he may
have made one statement in the lavatory of the bus depot.

Since

Mr. Parks was not sure who had made the statement it cannot constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt of appellant's complicity.
The sum of the legitimate inferences from the circumstantial evidence is not so conclusive as to preclude hypotheses
or explanations inconsistent with his innocence.

The evidence

in this case is more like the evidence in the Laub cage against
the defendant whose conviction was reversed than it is similar
to that against the defendant in the Johnson case.

The State must

prove a criminal act to sustain a conviction, State v. Bassett,
27 U.2d 272, 495 P.2d 318 (1972).Here, there was no evidence
of aiding and abetting by direct or indirect participation.
The best the State could even contend would be a very obtuse
inference that Dumas was a look-out for the robbery; made insufficient by Parks1 testimony which does not even suffice to show
that Dumas was there during the entire course of the criminal performance.

The evidence of "aiding and abetting11 is totally

insufficient, and to sustain his conviction based thereon is
to render the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard a sham and to
deny due process in contravention of the law of the State of
Utah.

.' II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2
At trial appellant requested the Court to give the
following jury instruction, designated Defendant's Proposed Jury
Instruction No. 2.
To warrant you in convicting the defendant
the evidence must, to your minds, exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the
guilt of the defendant. That is to say, if
after an entire consideration of and comparison
of all the testimony in the case, you can reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on
any reasonable ground other than the guilt
of the defendant, you must acquit him.
The Court refused to give this instruction which embodies what
is known as ftHodge's Rule" on the ground that such instructions
are required only in cases where all of the evidence of defendant's guilt is circumstantial.

Proper exception to the Court's

failure to give this instruction was made by the defense at Vol.IV
T.71.
The Court's statement of the law is correct, that is;
the "reasonable hypothesis1' instruction is applicable only to
circumstantial cases.

See e.g. State v. Garcia, 11 U.2d 67,

355 P.2d 57 (1960), wherein this court said:
... it is universally recognized that there
is no jury question without substantial evidence
indicating defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This requires evidence from which the
jury could reasonably find defendant guilty
of all material issues of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this rule, usually

with reference to the jury instructions, we
have held that where the only proof of material
fact or one which is a necessary element of
defendant's guilt consisted of circumstantial
evidence, such circumstances must reasonably
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence* (Quoting State v. Irwin,
101 U.365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941); State v.
Burch, 100 U.414, 115 P.2d 911 (1941); State
v. Laub, 102 U.402, 131 P.2d 805 (1942)"T?tarte
v. Anderson, 108 U.130, 158 P.2d 127, 159 ALR
340(1945); State yy Crawford, 59 U.39, 201
P.130 (19 21JTTeopTe W Scott, 10 U.217, 37
P.335 (1894)).
The trial Court's error in this case was not one of law, but
one of application of that law to the facts of the case.
Evidence was adduced by the State from which the jury
could conceivably have found defendant guilty on two separate
theories: first, that he accosted the victims, drew a weapon,
assaulted one of the victims, and attempted to rob him; and
second, that he was guilty by reason of his having been present
when the robbery was planned and executed, from which an inference
could have been drawn that he was an aider and abettor by planning
or encouragement or that he acted as a look-out.

As to the first

theory, all of the evidence was direct, and thus the Hodge's
Rule instruction would be inappropriate.

As to the second theory

however, all of the evidence was circumstantial, consisting solely
on the facts set forth at p. 16 supra.

The jury verdict in this

case did not require specification of the theory upon which guilt
was found.

We have no way of knowing the particular facts upon

which the jury relied to find defendant's guilt.

In such circumstances the general rule is as follows:
In order to sustain a general verdict
of guilty where the case has been submitted
to the jury under two distinct theories as
to the guilt of the accused, the evidence must
be sufficient to sustain a conviction upon
either. 30 Am.Jur.2d "Evidence", Sec. 1124,
Vol. 30 p.292, citing People v. Sullivan,
173 N.Y. 122, 65 N,E.980.
V
As indicated above, the evidence that appellant was guilty as
an aider and abettor is insufficient to sustain the verdict.

Furth

more, the failure to give the Hodge's Rule instruction requested
by defendant as to the aiding and abetting theory of the case
poses a substantial likelihood that the jury found his guilt
on that theory not only with insufficient evidence, but without
the benefit of a proper instruction.
A similar circumstance was faced by this Court in
State v. Pacheco, 27 U.2d 45, 492 P.2d 1347 (1972).

There

defendant was charged, apparently by a short form Information,
with the crime of grand larceny of a rifle.

Though there was

circumstantial evidence that Pacheco himself may have perpetrated
the burglary, there was also evidence that he may have acted as
an aider and abettor of his brother.

After the latter evidence

was in, the trial court, over objection, gratuitously instructed
the jury on the theory of aiding and abetting.

In reversing the

conviction this Court said at 492 P.2d 1348.
This man is entitled to a new trial since it
is impossible for this court to prestidigitate
whether the jury convicted the defendant of
larceny or aiding and abetting, under the record

in this case. We cannot enjoy the luxury or
humiliation in this county to sustain the conviction of a man on trite aphorism unsupported
by any kind of evidence.
The dissent says that there is no such
crime as aiding and abetting. Not so. To
convict for aiding and abetting, under Title
76-1-44, U.C.A. 1953 the State must prove first
that some other person, - in this case appellant's brother, Bob - committed the offense.
No effort was made by the State so to do, and
so far as this record is concerned Bob or anyone else has never been charged with the offense. ...
Though the facts presented by the Pacheco case are not in point,
the legal theory is, and should be applied to this case. Appellant Dumas, by motion for bill of particulars, requested the State
to set forth the
his guilt.

acts upon which it intended to rely in proving

The trial court refused to require the State to dis-

close these facts.

It was this action by the trial court that

made it unnecessary for the State to elect the theory upon which
it would proceed prior to trial, and which permitted it to introduce entirely contradictory evidence related to the defendant.
Here, as in Pacheco, it is impossible to determine which theory
it was upon which the jury convicted.

In Pacheco the difficulty

was that they had failed to prove that someone else had performed
the burglary which was viewed by this court to be a precondition
to an aiding and abetting conviction against Pacheco.

In this

case, the State proved no act or conduct of the defendant which
could have constituted aiding and abetting.
fatal to the convictions.

Both failures are

The legal posture of these cases is

identical.

Due process has been violated with the result that

this Court should under its holding in Pachecoy supra, grant appellant a new trial at which the State should be required to make
an election as to how it wishes to proceed.
a theory of aiding and abetting, the

If it proceeds on

,f

reasonable alternative hy-

pothesis11 instruction should be required.
Ill
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT A SEPARATE TRIAL
Appellant was charged by Information, Case No. 2 7644,
filed March 27, 1975.

Co-defendant Richard Ronald Nielson was

charged by similar Information, also bearing Case No. 27644, filed
March 13th, 1975.

Though arraigned separately, these two cases

were set for trial upon the same day.

Defendant Nielson filed

a motion, joined by appellant Dumas, seeking severance of the
two cases for trial.

Appellant resisted the joinder of the two

cases and sought severance on the ground, inter alia that there
was no statutory provision for joint trial of separately filed
criminal cases.

The objection to joinder and the motion to sever

were overruled and denied, respectively, and the cases were tried
together.
The rulings of the trial court both in joining the two
cases for trial and refusing to sever them upon motion of defendants were in contravention of the statutes of the State of Utah

and denied appellant due process.
First is the fact there is_ no provision permitting joint
trial of criminal defendants except Section 77-31-6 which provides:
When two or more defendants are jointly charged
with any offense, whether felony or misdemeanor,
they shall be tried jointly unless the court
in its discretion on motion of the prosecuting
attorney or any defendant orders separate trials. ...
There is no statutory definition of the term "jointly charged"; but
the phrase must be given its common meaning (77-21-26, U.C.A.
19 53, as amended).

Since multiple defendants can be charged

jointly under a single Information, "jointly charged" must refer
to that type of multiple-defendant Information.

In this case,

the County Attorney elected to file separate Informations on
separate dates; hence, these individuals were not jointly charged.
Therefore, Section 77-31-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, the only
Utah provision permitting joint trial of two or more defendants,
cannot be invoked, with the result that the act of the arraigning
judge in setting these two cases for joint trial was erroneous
and in contravention of law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing error, the matter was
exascerbated by the trial court's failure to sever.

Severance

in Utah is vested squarely within the discretion of the trial
judge, and who will not be reversed for failure to sever except
where he has abused his discretion.
180, 515 P.2d 41 (1973).
abuse of discretion".

State v. Lybert, 30 U.2d

The question raised is "what is an

The controlling case on that issue is

State v. Rivenburgh, 11 U.2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 wherein the court
set forth this rule:
When two or more defendants are jointly
charged with any offense they shall be tried
jointly, unless the court in its discretion
orders separate trials. If the ruling of the
court deprives the defendant of a fair triaT7
then the trial has abused its discretion.
The discretion may not be exercised arbitrarily (emphasis added). ~
" " ~""~~~~
Since this rule uses the legal conclusion "fair trial" to define
the legal conclusion "abuse of discretion," analysis of the facts
of each case is necessary to determine whether it has been
properly applied by the trial court*

Though they are stated

in the negative, the Rivenburgh case goes on to cite such factors
as "inconsistent or antagonistic defenses, and hostility ...
between the co-defendants, with each protesting his innocence
in condeming the other"; cooperation between the jointly tried
defendant's counsel; and propriety of instructions related to
evidence admissible against one defendant but not the other as
factors to be weighed in determining whether failure to sever
has deprived due process in any given case.

An analysis of these

factors will demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order severance in this case.
Here, the State adduced evidence that both George Dumas
(out of the mouths of Haynes and DeLucia) and Richard Ronald
Nielson (out of the mouth of Claude Aaron Parks) had accosted
Haynes and DeLucia and attempted to rob them by use of a firearm.

All the witnesses were, however, consistent in stating that only
one individual held a weapon.

As a result, the only way that

Nielson (against whom no evidence was introduced related to his
having participated in any other way) could defend himself was
to support the testimony of those who said that George Dumas
was the active assailent in the robbery.

On the other hand,

Dumas, in order to defend himself, had no alternative but to
support the testimony indicating that Nielson had held the weapon
as the first leg of his defense against having been both a direct
participant and an aider and abettor.

The net result was that

the State after having adduced directly conflicting evidence,
had nothing to do but sit back and watch the defendants distroy
each other.

The argument of the undersigned to the jury demon-

strates a distinct effort to convince the jury that Parks was
telling the truth.

Alternatively, the argument of counsel for

Nielson at Vol.IV T.25-37 constitutes a valiant effort to demonstrate that Parks was lying and that Dumas had the gun.

This

is not the kind of "different defense11 not found to be "inconsisten[t],f and

ff

antagonis [tic]ft in Rivenburgh, supra.

The de-

fenses of appellant and Nielson were a direct and absolute conflict.

Each of the defendants could be acquitted only if he

succeeded in convicting the other.

This antagonism was so clear

that it made it unnecessary for the State to either Mfish or
cut baitff in its argument to the jury as to which defendant had
performed which acts.

As a result of this inconsistency the

State was permitted to merely lay back and let the jury fen
for itself, secure in the knowledge that the trial would result
in at least one conviction because of the defendants1 need to
destroy each other.

If our statute and constitutional guarantee

of due process do not demand severance in this case they are for
naught.

The trial court's refusal to sever warrants a new trial.
w

• • > •

.
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V

DUE PROCESS WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S
LIMITATION OF DEFENDANT'S EFFORT TO REABILITATE THE TESTIMONY OF CLAUDE AARON PARKS
The State of Utah moved the Court to dismiss the charge
of robbery against Claude Aaron Parks and to grant him immunity
from prosecution for any acts committed by him in connection with
the robbery (Vol.1 T.ll).

The Court granted both motions (Vol.1

T.13), ruling that the matter would not placed in front of the
jury unless done so by the defense (Vol I. T.14).

Counsel for

co-defendant Nielson, on the cross-examination of Mr. Parks, made
a significant point of calling the attention of the jury to the
fact that Parks had asked for immunity in the case because he
was concerned that if not granted immunity he would be convicted
of robbery (Vol.1 T.47).
is made obvious in

The purpose of counsel's questioning

his summation where he strongly implies that

this grant of immunity was sufficient motive for Parks to have
lied about the involvement of Richard Ronald Nielson in the robbery
(Vol. IV T.24, 25 and 29). This argument was designed to strengthen

the testimony of Haynes and DeLucia that appellant, not Nielson,
had accosted them with a gun.
Argument of this ilk has been recognized, approved
and facilitated by the United States Supreme Court in Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 92 S.Ct. 763
(1972) which contains the following language:
Here the government's case depended almost
entirely on Talaiento's testimony; without it
there would have been no indictment and no evi- '
dence to carry the case to the jury. Talaiento's
credibility as a witness was therefore an important issue of the case, and evidence of any
understanding or agreement as to a future
prosecution would be relevant to his cred:Tbility and the jury was entitled to know it
(citing Napue v. Illinoisf 560 U.S. 264) femphasis added] .
~"
"~
Though the instant case does not contain the element
of suppression upon which Giglio is based, the square holding
of the Supreme Court that plea or dismissal information must
be disclosed to the jury to insure proper evaluation of the
credibility of the State's witnesses undoubtedly affected*the
verdict in this case by forcing disclosure of Parks' dismissai
by co-defendant's counsel.

The Supreme Court has, since Giglio,

had another occasion to treat this issue in DeMarco v. United
States, 415 U.S. 449, 39 L.Ed.2d 501, 94 S.Ct. 1185, in which
it remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the government had promised leniency to
a co-defendant witness before he testified that no promise had
been made to him with respect to the disposition of his case.

The Supreme Court, Renquist, Burger and Powell dissenting on
purely procedural grounds, remanded the case; restating the
holding of Giglio that if the promise had proceeded the witness1
testimony a new trial was warranted.

The Supreme Court as pre-

sently constituted seems to be squarely behind the Giglio decision.
Circuit Courts of Appeal have uniformly applied the holding of
Giglio under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, see
e.g. Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 1932 (6th Cir. 1974) where
an Ohio prosecutor deliberately mislead the jury with a summation
statement that a key prosecution witness had nothing to gain
by testifying, when the witness knew that his "chances" for an
early probation hinged on his testifying against defendant at
trial.

There, as here, the witness1 expectations were deemed

critical.
In U.S. v. Tashman, 478 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1973) appellant's co-defendant had negotiated a plea and received a
sentence of two years probation without those facts having been
disclosed to appellant.

The Fifth Circuit reversed using the

following language:
The action of counsel for Osbrach and the
government acquiesced in by the court was so
prejudicial as to require a new trial. Being
unaware of what occurred behind the closed doors
of the courtroom, appellant had no way of combatting the damaging testimony elicited by the
government from Osbrach. Faced with an apparently hostile witness, defendant's counsel
elected to forego examination of Osbrach. Under
the circumstances the jury had no way of knowing
what interest 'Osbrach had in testifying. We

oo

need not speculate on what effect knowledge
of the secrete contingent agreement would have
had on the jury"! The Supreme Court has made
it clear that the failure of the government
to disclose to the jury a plea bargaining negotiation by a key witness deprives the defendant
of constitutional due process [emphasis added].
Of further instruction is Berkholder v. State, 493 S.W. 2d 217
(Tex.C.A. 1973) where, in a murder trial anagreement had been
reached with co-defendant's lawyer that if he would testify
against defendant without demanding immunity he would not be
prosecuted (a transparent effort to evade Giglio).

The lawyer

told his client only that if he testified it would "help him.11
The Texas court held:
One reasonable inference to be drawn from the
Whitehurst's actions (in denying knowledge
of the deal in a qualified way) is that he
knew of the State's plan to not prosecute,
but also knew not to mention it for failure
of jeopardizing the entire scheme. Whether
or not this is true is not for us to decide.
The point is that the jury should have been
given an opportunity to judge Whitehurst's
credibility for themselves. The trial court's
refusal to require the disclosure of the
"
State's plan not to prosecute Whitehurst deprived the jury of that function.
In the instant case counsel for Nielson properly invoked
Giglio and effected disclosure of Parks' dismissal to the jury,
making considerable hay of it in argument.

This was proper.

The error here was that the jury was never informed that parks
was a federal parolee from Leavenworth Penitentiary and that
by admitting his complicity in the robbery on the witness stand
he was admitting a parol violation fully expecting that the

result would be his prompt return to prison.

The efforts of

appellant's counsel to inform the jury of these facts result
in the following (Vol.Ill T.X17-119):
Q.

[By Mr. Barber] Now, Mr. Parks there
has been evidence adduced in this trial
on stipulation that you received a grant
of immunity in exchange for your testimony,
correct?

A,

[By Mr. Parks] Yes.

Q.

And you understand by that, that you won't
be prosecuted by the State of Utah?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Despite that, do you have an opinion about
whether your having given the testimony
you have given at this trial will result
in your imprisonment?

A.

Do I have an opinion?

Q.

Yes.
MR. KELLER: Well, Your Honor, I object
to that. I just don't understand. For
one thing, if we are going to talk about
opinions, we need foundations. Mr. Parks
has already testified that he got immunity.
We stipulated to that. I am not sure what
Mr. Barber is trying to gain by a question
like that.
THE COURT:

Q.

Sustain the objection.

(By Mr. Barber) Well, State immunity,
Mr. Parks, results in your just being able
to walk away from this affair and not be
returned to prison?
MR. KELLER:
THE COURT:

Same objection.
Sustained.

MR. BARBER: Your Honor, I think this is
proper under Gi'glio.

THE COURT: No.
MR BARBER: The facts about his expectation
as a result of his testimony are clearly
relevant. There has been testimony going
one way and I think I am entitled to testify
going the other way.
THE COURT: I sustained the objection.
If he has any knowledge, you can ask him,
but I am not going to permit speculative
questions in that area.
Q.

(By Mr. Barber) Do you know, Mr. Parks,
whether any other legal action will be
taken?

A.

No, I don't know.

Q.

You don't.

All right, that is all I have.

If disclosure of a governmental proffer of immunity
to a witness is deemed by the United States Supreme Court to be
critical to due process presumably because of its power to tempt
false testimony for personal gain, how can it be said that information that the state proffer will not forestall the disaster
of a prison sentence likely to be imposed as a direct result
of the witnessy testimony be said to be any less critical to due
process?

How can a jury fairly assess a witness1 "probable motive

or lack thereof to testify [as he has]11 absent knowledge that
the substantial motive to lie shown at trial really amounts to
nothing to the witness?

It cannot:

for our jury system has

validity as a fact-finding institution only so long as we carefully guard its right to all information reasonably relevant
to a fair resolution of the facts. Whatever finding of fact the

jury in this case made about who wielded the weapon on Feburary
19, 1975 is invalid because made without teh benefit of relevant
information of overwhelming importance•

All appellant asks is

for a new trial at which the jury is given a fair "opportunity
to judge [Parks1] credibility for themselves."• The Supreme Court
of the United States has said that due process demands as much
and this Court should secure that guarantee to the citizens of
Utah.
V
THE INFORMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN QUASHED FOR
FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT
BILL OF PARTICULARS AND FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT RELATED TO DISCOVERY WHICH DENIED DUE
PROCESS AND THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A.

On April 9th, 1975 appellant filed a Motion for

Bill of Particulars requesting the court to order the State to
disclose "the particular acts allegedly performed by George 0.
Dumas which constitute the crime of robbery as charged."

This

motion, together with a similar motion filed by co-defendant
Nielson was denied on May 5th, 1975.

The denial of the motion

for these particulars was reversible error.
Section 77-21-9,.Utah Code Annot. 1953, as amended,
provides that if the Information "fails to inform the defendant
of the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable him to
prepare his defense, or to give him such information as he is
entitled to under the Constitution of [Utah]11 he is entitled to

a Bill of Particulars containing "such information as may be
necessary for these purposes/' The governing constitutional
principle is found in Article I Section 12 of the Constitution
of Utah which provides that "the accused shall have the right
to ... demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him
...ft.

It is obvious that the "cause" of an accusation against

an individual is normally his performance of some act which constitutes a crime.
This Court has given us some guidance as to the information to which criminal defendants are entitled.

In State v.

Robbins, 101 U. 119, 127 P.2d 1042, defendant appealed a robbery
conviction on the grounds that the Information filed against him
was inadequate to charge the offense of robbery because it did
not specify that the theft had been accomplished by force or fear.
In sustaining appellant's conviction the court said:
No question could have been in the mind of
Robbins as to the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. But if he were in doubt
the law provides that he may demand the nature
and cause of the action against him. The
alleged fact or facts which the State proposes
to prove may be secured by demanding a Bill
of Particulars (12 7 P.2d at l04j [emphasis
added].
In State v. Soloman, 93 U. 70, 71 P.2d 104 (1938) the court indicated that "the granting of a Bill of Particulars" is not discretionary with the court as it was at common law, but is a right
which the defendant can demand and which the court must grant
if the statutory conditions are met. ;

Because of the manifested tendencies of defense counsel
to abuse the right to a Bill of Particulars and to seek by that
means to obtain a preview of the State's evidence against their
clients, this court has clearly said that matters of mere evidence
are not discoverable by way of a Bill of Particulars;

lit State

v. Lack, 221 P. 2d 852 (1950) the defendant was charged with embezzlement from a State liquor store. He sought, by Bill of
Particulars, to obtain copies of invoices, delivery sheets, ledger
sheets, vendor reports, and other matters which this court character
ized as "evidentiary".

In sustaining the trial court's refusal

to order these matters disclosed by Bills of Particulars, the
court said:
..."The Bill of Particulars need not plead
matters of evidence." Section-105-21-9(1) U.C.A.
1943 was designed to enable a defendant to
have stated the particulars of the charge which
he must meet, where the short form indictment
or information is used. It was not intended
as a device to compel the prosecution to give
an accused person a preview of the evidence
on which the state relies to sustain the charge.
Recent pronouncements of this Court have done nothing to alter these
early guidelines.

State v. Moraine

f

25 U.2d 51, 475 P.2d 831

merely holds that a statement of a witness used against the defendant is the kind of "evidentiary" material which need not be
provided by the Bill of Particulars.

Similarly, State v. Lauder,

25 U.2d 418, 483 P.2d 887 holds that failure to require disclosure
of a statement by a witness which was never used at trial, and
of which defendant was already aware was not reversible error.

Furthermore, the court found that the defendants in both of these
cases had waived their right to the Bill by either failing to
object to the challenged testimony or to ask for a continuance
in order to prepare the case for defense where defendant felt
that the Bills provided was inadequate.
There remains then only one question:

Are the "par-

ticular acts performed by [defendant] which constitute the crime
of robbery" evidentiary facts or the "particulars of the offense11?
Appellant contends that the answer is obvious•

All the language

of the Motion for Bill of Particulars asks for is a description
of the acts allegedly performed which constitute the crime of
robbery.

It does not ask for disclosure of

the means or methods

by which State intends to prove that appellant performed those
acts.

It does not, like the Bills discussed in Meringue and

Lauder, ask for disclosure of statements of witnesses; neither
does it ask for the disclosure of documentary or any other kind
of evidence as did the motion in Lack.

This motion asked for

precisely what *this Court has said defendants are entitled to
* n R°kbins.

Section 76-2-202, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, can make

one a principal in a criminal endeavor for all sorts of different
conduct.

In this case, the State urged the jury to convict on

two theories, each supported by altogether different proofs.
Without knowing that the State intended to proceed on a contradictory basis, appellant's ability to properly defend this case
was substantially impaired.

Thus, the failure of the trial court

to-order the particulars demanded was reversible error.
B.

On" May 5th, 1975 defendant Nielson asked, by Motion

for Bill of Particulars for a list of the witnesses ..to. be called
at trial.

Appellant did not file an independent motion for this

information because of his knowledge that once the material had
been disclosed to defendant Nielson he would have equal access
to the information.

Thus he merely joined in Nielson's motion

for disclosure of the names of witnesses.

On May 5th, 1975 the

:

Honorable Bryant Croft ordered the State o£ Utah to provide defendants with the names and addresses of all witnesses to be called
at trial.

This Order is reflected by marginal notations on the

Motion for Bill of Particulars filed by Nielson.

On May 30th,

1975 the office of the Salt Lake County Attorney filed a list
of witnesses to be called at trial which showed the address of
Robert Allen Haynes and Richard DeLucia, the State's chief witnesses in the case, to be f,c/o J.L. Johnson, SLPD".

It is manifest

that J.L.Johnson is not the address of Robert Allen Haynes and
Richard DeLucia, both of whom are residents of the City of New
York.

On June 9th, 19 75 appellant filed a Motion to Quash based

on the failure of the State to file an adequate Bill of Particulars
as it related to the names and addresses of witnesses.

That Motion

contains a long and tortured recitation of the efforts of appellant's counsel to contact and interview two of the three eye
witnesses to the offense prior to trial.

The best that could

be done was a brief telephone conversation on the day preceding

trial which left insufficient time to verify or check out the
information given by the witnesses in that interview.
The courts are becoming increasingly sensitive to defendants need for access to witnesses and evidence prior to trial
in order to secure proper defense.

This awareness has been sup-

ported by the Supreme Court of the United States in such decisions
as Brady v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194
(1963).

The legal profession has also recognized this defense

need and has manifest its position in the ABA Standards related
to the administration of criminal justice.

Section 3.11 thereof

states:
DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a
prosecutor to fail to make timely disclosure
to
the defense of the existence of evidence,
known to him, supporting the innocence of the
defendant. He should disclose evidence which
would tend to negate the guilt of the accused
or mitigate the degree of the offense or reduce
the punishment at the earliest feasible opportunity.
(b) The prosecutor should comply in good
faith with the discovery procedures under applicable law\
(c) It is unprofessional conduct for a
prosecutor intentionally to avoid pursuit of
evidence because he believes it will damage
the prosecution's case or the accused.
In a redundant citation to this Court of what the law is in some
jurisdictions and what it ought to be in all jurisdictions,
attention is again called to State V. Gregory, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).

There, defendant was charged with a capital offense.

The federal statute required that a list of names of witnesses
be furnished to defendant no later than two days prior to trial.

The prosecutor apparently provided the names and addresses of
the witnesses, and though he did not instruct them not to talk
to defense counsel, he did advise them not to talk to anyone
unless he was present.
by defense counsel.

The witnesses refused to be interviewed

In reversing the appellant1s conviction

the D.C. Circuit Court held:
... Witnesses, particularly eye witnesses to
a crime are the property of neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides have an
equal right, and should have an equal opportunity
to interview them. Here the defendant was denied
that opportunity which, not only the statute,
but elemental fairness and due process required
that he have ...
A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for truth. That quest will
more often be successful if both sides have
an equal opportunity to interview the persons
who have the information from which the truth
may be determined. The current tendency in
the criminal law is in the direction of discovery
of the facts before trial and elimination of
surprise at trial. A related development in
the criminal law is the requirement of the
prosecution not frustrate the defense in the
preparation of its case. Information favorable
to the defense must be made available to the
defense (citing Brady). Reversal of convictions
for suppression o£ such evidence, and even for
mere failure to disclose, have become common
place. It is not suggested here that there
was any direct suppression of evidence. But
there was unquestionably a suppression of means
by which the defense could obtain "evidence.
The defendant could not know what the eye witness
to the events in suit would testify to or how
firm they were in their testimony unless defense
counsel was provided a fair opportunity for
interview. In our judgment the prosecutor's
advice to those eye witnesses frustrated that
effort and denied appellant a fair trial [emphasis
added] .

Just as in Gregory, the Salt Lake County Attorney in this case
"frustrated" defendant's effort to interview two critical witnesses prior to trial.

That frustration substantially penalized

appellant's efforts to probe the testimony of those eye witnesses
that appellant held the weapon during the robbery and to explore
the possibility that their statements to that effect were in
error and that the contrary testimony of Parks was more accurate.
The list of witnesses supplied by the State is far from a "good
faith11 effort to comply with a lawful order of the trial court.
The prosecutor's action denied and frustrated due process.
Question:

Why is it that prosecutors in this State

persist in frustrating defense efforts at discovery at the expense
of speed and dispatch in trials of criminal causes themselves
and ofttimes at the expense of fundamental fairness?
Answer:

This Court does not require them to do other-

w i s e . ;"•'• •

Appellant urges this Court to adopt the rule of Gregory
and to direct prosecutors to comply with the ABA Standards related
to the administration of criminal justice as they apply to the
disclosure of evidence; and to do so by reversing this case and
remanding it for new trial.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, appellant prays this Court
to enter its Order reversing its conviction and either quashing

the information against him or remanding the case to the District
Court for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
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